Morocco’s Upcoming Elections: Assessing an Outcome Prophecy

Morocco’s Upcoming Elections: Assessing an Outcome Prophecy

The outbreak of Arab revolutions is testimonial to the inability of epistemic communities to predict the behaviour of the Arab street. Likewise, speculations about an overwhelming victory of the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in the upcoming Moroccan legislative elections of November 25th, based on a would-be analogy with the Tunisian experience in which Ennahda Party (EP) came out winner, show their limitations in more ways than one. A brief comparative analysis between the EP and the PJD show that the outcome of the November 25th polls is all the more uncertain.

In Tunisia, EP has drawn advantage from its exclusion by the ousted regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. To its credit, it has incarnated an opposition long directed against a regime whose repressive and authoritarian drifts were matched only by the lack of strategic responsiveness and liberalizing initiatives. The fact that EP has had no experience in governance reifying its ability to achieve expectations added to its credibility. This partly explains why EP gained the confidence of the Tunisian population as a reliable alternative.

In Morocco, the situation is different. In contrast to a general belief, the PJD is well established in the political landscape and is far from monopolizing the opposition. The PJD has not only participated in previous elections, but has also invested itself in several experiments in local governance. To avoid mentioning the embarrassing case of Abubakr Belkora[1], which remains questionable according to the PJD, it is at least possible to say today that there is little empirical evidence for assessing the performance of the PJD. By extension, there is an element of surprise related to the potential of this party to win the largest share of the vote in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

Another decisive factor supporting this claim has to do with the amazigh[2] issue. Two features characterize the population of Tunisia. First, the homogeneity of its population in terms of cultural and religious components and second, amazigh activism has not gained enough steam to politicize its cause thus far. Unlike Tunisia, amazigh activism is a crucial pocket of mobilisation in the Moroccan political landscape[3]. If the Constitution of July 1st recognized amazigh as a national language, it is useful to keep in mind that the PJD has taken a rather unique position vis-à-vis this aspect of the reform.

During the debate preceding the vote on the new constitution, Abdelilah Benkirane, Secretary General of the PJD, opposed to integration of amazigh as a national language in the new text. As a reaction, amazigh associations and youth interpreted this pronouncement as hostile. On august 6th, 2011, protesters of the 20th February Movement chanted intimidating slogans against the party in the region of Souss (Southern Morocco). A Facebook page was created to demand its dissolution. Arehmouche Ahmed, an activist of the movement and Chairman of the Amazigh Network for Citizenship (RAC) declared his intent to file a complaint against the PJD. To push the analysis further, it is possible to argue that the likely alliance of the PJD with the Istiqlal Party (IP) would also be weighing negatively on its popularity in amazigh areas, given the perception of the IP as the political formation that has constantly defended an ‘arabization’ of Moroccan administration and education.

Uncertainty about electoral results is a new phenomenon in the Arab World. In this respect, Morocco is a case in point; the country is experiencing a “pacific spring” without an a priori idea about the outcome of the polls. If the victory of the EP was widely expected in Tunisia and elsewhere, the capacity of political parties in rallying hesitant voters is key to shaping the end result in Morocco. The PJD, as one favourite, will have to demonstrate unparalleled skills in rectifying its image among the amazigh community which represents a weighing majority. In so doing, the party should avoid alliance with the IP to make its voice heard. However, this appears a hard option to opt for, given the fact that the PJD is facing a fierce competition from the newly formed strong coalition of G8[4].

[1] Like other parties, the PJD has been accused of corruption. In early 2009, Aboubakr Belkora, former mayor of the city of Meknes (northern Morocco), was accused of “mismanagement of municipal funds” and dismissed from his post, a development that triggered much internal tension within the PJD.

[2] Many Berbers call themselves some variant of the word Imazighen (singular: Amazigh), possibly meaning “free people” or “free noble men” (the word has probably an ancient parallel in the Roman name for some of the Berbers, “Mazices”). Tamazight is the Berber language. It is divided into three dialects

[3] The exact population of Berber speakers is hard to ascertain and has given rise to intense debate among scholars given the fact that mixed marriages have been a constant historical pattern in Morocco. What is sure however is that amazigh identity is well rooted in the Moroccan society.

[4] In a move to isolate the PJD, a number of very diverse parties have, under the leadership of the Parti Authenticité et Modernité (PAM), joined forces to form an alliance titled G8.